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This working paper reports the findings of a detailed empirical study of 414 enforceable undertakings 
accepted by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the corporate, market, finance 
and credit services regulator from July 1998 to 31 December 2015, a period of 17.5 years.   
The study is unique in size, scope and comprehensiveness.  It presents a detailed profile of all parties 
giving enforceable undertakings and the misconduct issues in their undertakings over a 17.5 year period; 
and breaks new ground by offering the first empirical analysis of the core commitments or undertakings 
given by parties to enforceable undertakings to rectify their misconduct.  It constructs a much needed 
road map through the maze of regulated firms, activities, misconduct and undertakings involved in ASIC’s 
deployment of enforceable undertakings. 
The study offers a comprehensive profile of the regulated firms and individuals who are the subject of ASIC 
accepted enforceable undertakings.   Key findings were that: 
 ASIC accepted almost identical numbers of enforceable undertakings from companies (n=174) and 
individuals (n = 176).  Enforceable undertakings by companies in combination with individuals (n = 
64) declined in number over the study period.  
 The most common regulated entities from whom ASIC accepted enforceable undertakings were 
private companies (n = 156 or 50.2% of all companies giving EUs) and individuals in their position as 
directors (n =137 or 57.8% of all individuals giving EUs). 
 Publicly listed companies were a small subset of parties giving enforceable undertakings (n = 30 or 
9.6% of all companies giving EUs). 
Activities and Misconduct Regulated by Enforceable Undertakings 
The study also offers a detailed profile of the types of misconduct addressed by enforceable undertakings 
accepted by ASIC.  Key findings were that:   
 The most common activity that was the subject of enforceable undertakings was financial services 
(n = 190), representing 45.9% of the data set.  The largest single activity involved in financial 
services was giving of financial or investment advice, comprising 40% of all financial services 
activity. 
 Enforceable undertakings concerning financial services involved three common types of activity: 
the promotion, marketing, advertising and sale of financial services; the provision of specific 
financial advice or product recommendations; and the governance of financial services firms. 
 
 
 
 
 Financial services laws was the most common misconduct issue, present in 50% of all enforceable 
undertakings followed by misleading and deceptive conduct, present in 30.4% of all enforceable 
undertakings.  
Types of Undertakings Given in Enforceable Undertakings 
The study of core undertakings in enforceable undertakings revealed:  
 The most common types of undertaking proffered by regulated parties were compliance review 
undertakings. They were present in 42.3% of enforceable undertakings.   
 Compliance systems reviews and reviews of compliance with specific legal obligations were the 
dominant types of review undertakings.  The appointment of an independent expert was a 
requirement of 85% of all review undertakings, typically for a review that took up to 12 months to 
complete.   
 Voluntary management and other activity bans were a feature of 36.5% of all undertakings, the 
majority of which were given by individuals.  In 36% of cases, the bans were for a period of 
between 2 and 5 years.  In 20% of the undertakings, the bans were permanent in effect.  
 Directors’ voluntary management bans were typically accompanied by a second ban from providing 
financial services in one quarter of enforceable undertakings.  
 Training or continuing professional education was a key feature of enforceable undertakings by 
auditors and liquidators, where they are subjected to a voluntary ban for a specific term or practice 
supervision by their peers.  The professional education requirement was not as common in relation 
to other enforceable undertaking groups.  
 A strategically directed, industry-wide approach to enforceable undertakings was evident in ASIC’s 
acceptance of enforceable undertakings relating to financial services, specifically financial planning 
or wealth management activities.  Regulated firms typically committed to legal compliance systems 
review and individual representatives committed routinely to cease working in the sector.  
These findings offer rich insights into the dynamics of negotiated settlements in the public enforcement of 
business laws in Australia.  With ASIC’s increased emphasis on co-operation in its investigation and 
enforcement work, a detailed understanding of these issues has never been more timely or important. 
 
